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Review
The Legacy of Iraq: From the 2003 War to the
“Islamic State”
Benjamin Isakhan (ed). Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press,
2015. 278pp.

Kieran McConaghy*
Benjamin Isakhan’s The Legacy of Iraq attempts to take a holistic look at the totality of
political developments and relationships in Iraq since the U.S.-led invasion in 2003. The
book has contributions from more than a dozen experts in aspects of Iraq’s history and
politics.
Part of the strength of any edited volume is that the final product is always more
than the sum of its parts. The view of Iraq that this book gives is certainly more granular
and richly textured than any author could manage on their own. The sharpness of its focus
on the legacy that the Iraq war has left behind add to the sense of the study as an important
and impressive work. Isakhan has divided the book into four parts, addressing the aftermath
of the war in terms of decisions and mistakes, Iraqi politics since the war, the state of Iraqi
culture and civil society, and the regional and international implications of the conflict in
turn. These notional themes give the book a sort of coherence that some edited volumes
can lack. However, given the vastness of the subject and depth of knowledge of the
contributing authors, there are still some points that involve bridging a wide gap. The
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juxtaposition of Philippe Le Billon’s chapter on the politics of Iraq’s oil wealth with
Aloysia Brooks’ on torture in Abu-Ghraib seem jarring. At the same time, the completely
separated discussion of the Kurdish “problem” by Liam Anderson and Iraq’s “ultraminorities” means that the chance to deal holistically with the position of minorities since
the U.S. withdrawal has been missed. Issues such as sectarianism, ethnic violence, and Shia
consolidation of power are themes that spring up in all sections. Given their central
importance to an appreciation of post-Saddam Iraq, this is understandable.
Perhaps Isakhan in putting together this collection has attempted to do too much
at once. His own contributions to the book of three chapters, an introduction and conclusion
have convinced me that he could have proffered a short monograph of his own on postconflict Iraq with little extra effort, given his record of insightful and incisive work on the
country. Nevertheless, the high calibre of the majority of the chapters and breadth of topics
they cover demonstrate an area ripe for more scholarly attention. Indeed, no serious
academic ought to offer their thoughts on the cause, character and likely fate of jihadism
in Iraq and the Syrian Civil War without an understanding of the interwoven travails faced
by Iraq both before and after the U.S.-led invasion. As such, this book is essential reading
for scholars and students of terrorism studies alike
In chapter one, Isakhan gives a detailed account of de-Baathification in postSaddam Iraq. The questionable prioritisation of the process of de-baathification has
allowed the Accountability and Justice Commission (AJC) to be wielded as a sectarian tool
of the Shia political elite. This prioritisation gave rise to claims that the process was little
more than “de-Sunnification” (25) and a tool for hamstringing the opposition ahead of
elections. The prioritisation of de-Baathification by U.S. neo-conversations, designed to
echo “de-Nazification” thus failed to take heed the lessons of post-conflict reconstruction
in war-torn areas in the latter half of the 20th century (22). Furthermore, longstanding
grievances and trauma that continues to haunt Iraq have been left largely unaddressed while
state apparatus has been dismantled in the process.
Philippe Le Billon turns our attention in chapter two to the politics of Iraq’s oil
wealth. Critics of the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq have long suspected that security of Iraq’s
oil for the U.S. and the west more generally, was the concealed, central reason for the
military engagement. Le Billon’s mention of the non-competitive award of contracts to UK
and U.S. companies and the bashfulness of the two administrations in talking about oil does
little to disrupt this view, even if the sheer scale of the sector and sensitivity to the potential
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for negative publicity meant that they did not monopolise the market (38–39). He qualifies
this, however, quoting Duffield (2012) in saying that while oil might not have been the
central objective, it certainly made the decision to invade a lot easier for the U.S. and UK.
Less commented upon and more useful in explaining the trajectory of Iraq in the years
since 2003 is the section on the domestic implications of Iraq’s oil wealth. The
geographical concentration of oil in Sunni areas has led to animosity and “feelings of
dispossession” amongst some Kurds and Shia, while some Sunnis fear that Kurds and Shia
will exploit the arrangements to cash in disproportionately. It is clear from Le Billon’s
chapter that despite Iraq’s considerable potential oil wealth, among the highest in the world
(49) it is not benefitting the average Iraqi. Rather the U.S. intervention with respect to the
oil sector has resulted in high wastage, increased sectarian animosity, and with a weakened
state, has made oil a lucrative source of funding for political violence.
Aloysia Brooks’ chapter on torture in Abu Ghraib powerfully brings the attention
to one of the worst missteps of the entire war in Iraq. Brooks argues persuasively that the
impact of the Abu Ghraib debacle did not stop at the torture, but that the flimsy judicial
and political responses devalued the lives of Iraqis and irreparably sullied the reputation of
the coalition as a force for protecting human rights (62). The prosecution of whistle
blowers, lenient sentences for perpetrators, immunity for private contractors, and
discursive relabelling of torture as “abuse” or “mistreatment,” argues Brooks, have left a
legacy, the enormity of which has yet to be felt.
In part two, the attention turns to Iraqi politics since Saddam. That attention goes
beyond the Sunni-Shia tensions to discuss the important position of Kurds and those
branded “ultra-minorities” is laudable. However, more could have been done to make these
chapters speak to each other. As it stands, the chapters, each authoritative in their own
right, leave us with a fragmented view of the whole. Ronen Zeidel makes excellent points
about Sunni soul-searching and the formation of a new kind of Sunni political identity postSaddam in chapter six. This identity Zeidel asserts must hinge on Sunni Muslims’ role as
a constitutive part of a new multi-identity Iraq, rather than on embittered sectarianism or
fundamentalist religiosity (108–9). This crisis of identity is only understandable in light
of the picture Isakhan paints in chapter four, on the Al-Maliki government’s
authoritarianism and the tendency of the Da’wa Party to build a state-within-a-state while
dressing it as democratic reform. Al-Maliki’s militancy, sectarianism and tendency towards
increasing authoritarianism is painfully ironic, given the stated ambition of the U.S.-led
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coalition in ousting Saddam in the first place. Indeed, the tone of Maliki has much to answer
for in fomenting Sunni grievances in the years since 2003. If understanding the totality of
relations post-Saddam is the aim of this book, then a co-authored chapter between Isakhan
and Zeidel that could have looked at the interaction of Iraq’s two largest political forces
might have been more useful, with the impressively granular detail Isakhan gives in chapter
four saved for another publication.
In chapter five, Liam Anderson’s focus on the Kurdish problem since 2003 draws
attention to the relative success of the Kurdistan region, and the price that might have been
paid by the rest of Iraq for this. Recognition of the federally autonomous Kurdish Regional
Government, language rights, control over internal security, recognition of some territorial
claims and control over internal security under the 2005 constitution afforded the Kurds
the most lucrative and advantageous position of any ethnic group in the post-Saddam Iraq
(84). Anderson draws attention to “textual ambiguities” built into the constitution, which
have since become battle grounds (84), critiquing the document’s grey areas and
Hamoudi’s view (2013) that the document’s ambiguity offers potential for Iraqi’s to heal
divisions. The constitutionally protected rights afforded to the Kurds has been the source
of continuing animosity between Baghdad and Erbil. Anderson rounds up the chapter by
offering some alternatives to the current arrangements, a welcome look beyond Iraq to
existing constitutional arrangements that could work for Iraq’s Kurds, though how this
would be implemented and by whom is something that ultimately remains unanswered.
Nicholas Al-Jeloo’s chapter on Iraq’s ultra-minorities adds nuance to our
understanding of a conflict that is far too often understood only through Shia, Sunni and
Kurdish prisms. Indeed, these “ultra-minorities” often cut across the more well-known
blocs, as well as lying outside of them. In discussing the chaotic and ineffective legislative
and constitutional measures designed to give minorities protection, al-Jeloo does well to
complicate the view of post-Saddam Iraq and talk about the disproportionate suffering of
ultra-minorities, showing how damaging the common discourse of ‘all Iraqis are suffering’
is, as Chaldo-Assyrian Christians flee, Mandaeans come close to being eradicated, while
the tiny Jewish population post 2003 has largely gone into hiding. What is clear is that the
current plight of ultra-minorities in Iraq is directly related to the U.S.-led invasion in 2003
and the failure of the coalition to take these concerns seriously enough (120). The
continued existence of some of the small communities that Al-Jeloo describes remains
threatened, and he asserts, nothing less than renewed legislative measures, new
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constitutional protections, and harsh punishments for clerics who incite violence against
these minorities will do to assure their place in the Iraq of the future.
Part Three turns to focus on the plight of Iraqi culture and civil society. A chapter
from Isakhan on the relationship of the Iraqi oil unions to the Al Maliki government leads
the section, followed by contributions from Perri Campbell and Luke Howie on women’s
rights and digital media in post-invasion Iraq, and Diane C. Siebrandt on the impact of
coalition military operations on archaeological sites. Siebrandt’s chapter comes as
considerable attention, both scholarly and journalistic, has been paid to the destruction of
antiquities and archaeological sites by jihadist organisations including Gamal Islamiyah,
Al Qaeda in Iraq, and Islamic State. Siebrandt notes that, perhaps paradoxically, the “shock
and awe” tactics of the initial invasion did little damage to the considerable archaeological
sites in Iraq (153), but that the following occupation caused damage to a range of sites
(156). Furthermore, the failure of the coalition to engage with and respect the wellestablished authorities for protecting cultural heritage led to alienation (159). Indeed,
Siebrandt goes as far as to say that the actions of the coalition with regards to Iraq’s cultural
heritage during the invasion and occupation were “seen once again as a Western power
practising overtly colonial rule over Iraqi sites” (159), though the author could have done
more to evidence this assertion. Doubtless, the way in which the coalition’s poorly planned
invasion impacted Iraq’s archaeological sites and cultural heritage would not have been
well received, but including the voice of Iraqis on the matter would have added weight to
this chapter.
Ranj Alaaldin tackles the topic of Shia ascendancy in Iraq and its role in the wider
process of sectarian polarisation of the Middle East. With the fall of Saddam, Iraq became
a battlefront in a sectarian proxy war fought by Iraq’s neighbours (181). Alaaldin argues
that this was possible since in the violent containment that had existed under Saddam
removed, pre-existing divisions festered and conflict intensified. The lack of a party that
represented Sunni concerns once the Baath Party had been banned led to tensions as their
Shia counterparts mobilised politically. The sectarian tensions in Iraq thus played directly
into tensions on the regional level and long-standing Sunni fears of a Shia crescent forming
from Tehran to Damascus through Baghdad (189). The repercussions on the region are
clear to be seen. Many of those who cut their teeth in the Iraq insurgency post-invasion
continue to be active in the Syrian Civil War. The sectarian tensions of Iraq have been
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mirrored at a regional level, argues Alaadlin. He remains doubtful as to what could have
been done to prevent the reopening of sectarian tensions in the new Iraq.
Campbell and Howie’s chapter states in stark terms the impact that the invasion,
occupation and subsequent political and social developments have had on Iraqi women.
First, the authors highlight how Westerners’ ability to understand women’s lives in Iraq is
determined by the information made available in academia and the media (139). They
draw from the work of Judith Butler (2009) to highlight how our understanding not just of
conflict as historical event but ways of life in Iraq is necessarily mediated by these “frames
of life.” In this chapter as in others, the lack of planning on the part of the coalition forces
ahead of the invasion and the impact this has had is thrown into sharp relief. Despite the
rhetoric of the so-called liberation of Iraqi women, some measures made in the early days
of the occupation abolished important legislation that had protected and advanced women’s
rights (142). What follows in the chapter does not purport to represent the experience of
all Iraqi women or even the average experience, but in giving two personalised accounts
of Iraqi women post-invasion, their experiences are heard and abstract narratives about
women’s rights in Iraq are humanised.
This section on civil society and culture adds colour and depth to the book that
would otherwise be missing. To extend the idea of “frames,” it is striking how little
consideration of society and life in post-invasion Iraq is considered by academics apart
from high politics, constitutional arrangements and meso and macro level issues. More
work on the impact of these new arrangements on the many other aspects of culture and
society are badly needed.
Having dealt mostly at the state level, the fourth and final part of the book deals
with regional and international level concerns. In his chapter, Howard Adelman gives a
clinical dissection of ethnic cleansing episodes in Iraq from 2002 onwards. The sheer
numbers of those displaced over the course of a decade is shocking. Adelman’s depiction
of Iraq since the U.S.-led coalition invasion in 2003 is of an Iraq that has been permanently
disfigured by ethnic conflict, ethnic cleansing and sectarianism. The mismanagement of
the coalition and their failure to recognise the severity of the problem has exacerbated the
problem, led to the decimation of small minority communities across Iraq, and generated a
refugee problem where tens of thousands if not hundreds of thousands do not wish to return
home. The knock on effect on neighbouring Syria is explained and the instability, unrest
and enmity was fertile recruiting territory for ISIS amongst other militant groups.
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In highlighting the international impact of the Iraq War, Joseph Camilleri draws
attention to four interlinked action-reaction syndromes in which the Iraq war has brought
insecurity, nuclear proliferation, great power rivalry, terrorism and politically driven
sectarianism (219). Camilleri’s prudent points regarding the paradox of a link to terrorism
as a justification for the invasion and the subsequent foothold that terrorist groups have
gained in the region because of the resulting instability is well made. While several of the
other chapters take issue principally with the way in which the invasion and occupation
was executed, Camilleri makes astute points about the weakening of the position of the UN
Security Council and changes to international norms that the intervention has helped to
catalyse (220–21).
The landscape of interventionism has changed since the Iraq War, with clear
impact on the doctrines of humanitarian intervention as Binoy Kampmark notes in his
contribution. The idea of the Iraq War as a humanitarian intervention is on shaky ground
to begin with. A humanitarian tone to a political intervention perhaps best describes the
scenario given Kampmark’s emphasis on the lack of humanitarian grounds and clear
political objectives of the invasion (197). This was a humanitarian mission in only the
loosest sense of the term. What comes through from Kampmark’s chapter is that despite
efforts of later humanitarian missions to differentiate and stand in contrast to Iraq, the
highly complex and idiosyncratic nature of conflicts mean that there is every chance that
missteps could be made again, with interventions bringing more instability in the long term
than they bring protection in the short term.
The Legacy of Iraq is a book that gives the reader a multi-dimensional view of the
country in the years since the 2003 invasion. There is no claim by the editor or any
contributor to offer the definitive treatment. In many ways, while we are maybe at a critical
distance from the 2003 invasion, it might still be too early to fully assess the legacy of that
decision to intervene and the character of the occupation. As I said earlier, there is overlap
between the contributions of many of the authors in the book and any one of the four parts
is broad enough to have commanded its own full-length book. Nevertheless, this is the first
serious attempt I have seen to take a multi-level look at Iraq since the invasion. There is
enough in it for the book to appeal to those in disciplines like peace and conflict, security
studies, terrorism studies, strategic studies, gender, and international relations. Of course,
anyone seeking to understand developments in the Middle East post-2003 would be foolish
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to omit it from their reading. The Legacy of Iraq might not answer all the questions, but it
certainly sets a few hares running and opens clear avenues for further research.
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